By: Alan Schindler, Esq. and Anna Goldman, Esq.
Far Horizons, LLC v. Flying Dutchman , Inc. , 22CA1298
Division III, Opinion by Judge Jones, Judge Johnson and Judge Shutz concur
Decision: Reversed and remanded with directions
Procedure: On appeal from District Court, Summit County, Judge Karen A. Romeo
Factual Background and District Court Holding:
Under the parties’ contract, Plaintiff was entitled to exclusively use one parking space in Defendant’s condominium parking lot. Plaintiff made a demand for a parking space and Defendant ignored that demand. Plaintiff sued Defendant, and the district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff, ordering Defendant to designate an exclusive parking space for Plaintiff. Defendant subsequently provided Plaintiff with a parking space that was located directly under a basketball hoop. Plaintiff asserted that this designation of the parking space was unreasonable. The district court found that the location was not unreasonable but was also not exclusive because of its proximity to the basketball hoop. The court ordered Defendant to take certain steps to make the parking space exclusive. Plaintiff also brought a separate breach of contract claim, and a jury found Defendant not liable. Following motions for attorney fees and costs, the district court concluded that Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this case as a whole, but that it had to award attorney fees on a claim-by-claim basis. Since Plaintiff prevailed on one claim and Defendant prevailed on the other, the court awarded attorney fees to both parties accordingly. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs.
Issue on Appeal: Whether the court must determine which party was the overall prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees under the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act.
The Court considered whether, in 2006, the General Assembly amended section 38-33.3-123(1)(c) to require a court to determine the “prevailing party” based on which party prevailed on CCIOA-covered claims as a whole. Previously, divisions of the court required trial courts to determine the prevailing party in an action subject to CCIOA on a claim-by-claim basis, but these decisions were expressly based on statutory language then in effect requiring an award to the prevailing party “[f]or each claim or defense.” § 38-33.3-123(1)(c), C.R.S. 2005.
In 2006, the General Assembly substantially amended the statute to require courts to determine the prevailing party in the “civil action.” A “civil action” is the whole of a court case. See Hernandez v. Downing , 154 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Colo. 2007). Following, the Court concluded that that section 38-33.3-123(1)(c), as amended in 2006, requires a court to determine the prevailing party in the action as a whole, and not on a claim-by-claim basis, so since Plaintiff was the prevailing party in the action as a whole, their attorneys’ fees should not have been reduced.
Puerta v. Newman , 22CA2021
Division VI, Opinion by Judge Lipinsky, Judge Welling and Judge Gomez concur
Decision: Affirmed
Procedure: On appeal from District Court, Huerfano County, Judge M. Jon Kolomitz
Factual Background and District Court Holding:
Plaintiff was shot by an individual who was later arrested by police. Defendants, members of the police department, did not process and submit the gun, bullets, and other evidence of the shooting to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (the CBI) until four days before the deadline for discovery disclosures to the defense. Because the CBI had insufficient time to examine the evidence before the disclosure deadline, the prosecutor concluded that the evidence could not be introduced at the shooter’s attempted murder trial and instead elected to use only the admissible evidence of the shooting to support a lesser menacing charge. Plaintiff then filed a civil complaint alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights under article II, sections 16a and 25 of the Colorado Constitution by failing to timely process the evidence in the case against the shooter. He also contended that he was entitled to a civil remedy for these violations under section 13-21-131(1), C.R.S. 2023. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(5), which the district court granted.
Issue on Appeal: Whether a crime victim may assert claims against peace officers for violation of the victim’s civil rights premised on the officers’ failure to timely process evidence that would allegedly have resulted in the conviction of the victim’s assailant for a specific offence under 13-21-131(1), C.R.S. 2023.
The Court found that nothing in the Victims’ Rights Act (the Act), §§ 24-4.1-300.1 to -305, C.R.S. 2023, which appears at section 24-4.1-301, C.R.S. 2023 gave rise to a constitutionally protected property interest in this case. Although the Act grants certain rights to crime victims, nothing in the Act indicates that crime victims have a right to compel the police to process evidence.
Further, nothing in either the Act nor section 13-21-131(1) indicates that victims are entitled to recover monetary damages for police offers’ failure to timely process evidence.
Colorado Sun v. Brubaker , 21CA1608
Division VII, Opinion by Judge Harris, Judge Gomez concurs; Judge Pawar dissents
Decision: Reversed and remanded with directions
Procedure: On appeal from district court, City and County of Denver, Judge Darryl F. Schockley
Factual Background and District Court Holding:
In this case brought under the Colorado Open Records Act, §§ 24-70-201 to -230, C.R.S. 2023, several media organizations sought records showing the total number of child abuse reports received over a three-year period from certain residential care facilities. The records custodian for the Colorado Department of Human Services (DHS) denied the requests, citing a provision of the Children’s Code that prohibits disclosure of child abuse reports as well as “the name and address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying information contained in such reports.” § 19- 1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. DHS claimed that disclosure of the requested information would necessarily reveal the address of a child or informant because the requests were linked to specific addresses of residential care facilities. On judicial review of DHS’s denial, the district court entered judgment in favor of DHS, and the media organizations appealed.
Issue on Appeal: Whether section 19-1-307(1)(a) prohibits, under all circumstances, the disclosure of any address contained in a child abuse report or whether the statute prohibits disclosure of an address only when the address constitutes “identifying information.”
After deeming section 19-1-307(1)(a) ambiguous, the Court analyzed the legislative history of the statute and ultimately found that the General Assembly “intended to keep confidential only information that could reveal a person’s or family’s identity.” Therefore, construing the statute to only prohibit disclosure of an address when the address constitutes “identifying information” is more consistent with the intent of the General Assembly. The alternative construction would require that some nonidentifying information is kept confidential, which does not square with the legislative history.
The Court concluded that the statute prohibits disclosure of an address only when the address constitutes “identifying information,” and reversed the district court’s findings and remanded the case.
Dissent :
Judge Pawar dissented, opining that the only one reasonable way to read the statute is that the statute prohibits the disclosure of any address under all circumstances, so the use of legislative history is unnecessary. Further, Judge Pawar found “the suggestion that the General Assembly intended to protect the names and addresses of children in child abuse reports only in certain circumstances… absurd and illogical.”
Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 22CA0887
Division II, Opinion by Judge Fox, Judge Furman and Judge Pawar concur
Decision: Affirmed
Procedure: On appeal from district court, Arapahoe County, Judge Elizabeth Beebe Volz
Factual Background and District Court Holding:
In this personal injury action, plaintiff sued defendant, Sears, after being electrocuted by her stove, which a Sears repairperson had incorrectly wired. A jury awarded plaintiff $2,700,000 in damages but the district court reduced her noneconomic damages to the statutory cap in section 13-21-102.5(3)(a), C.R.S. 2023.
Issue on Appeal: Whether the statutory cap infringes on the right to a civil jury trial as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Both the Supreme Court and Colorado courts have held that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc ., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis , 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916); Firelock Inc. v. Dist. Ct ., 776 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Colo. 1989). The Court declined to overturn this longstanding precedent.
Even if the Court applied the Seventh Amendment to the states, federal courts have upheld damage caps under the Constitution. See Tudor v. Se. Okla. State Univ ., 13 F.4th 1019, 1046 (10th Cir. 2021); Patton v. TIC United Corp ., 77 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 1996); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
The Court ultimately concluded that because the Seventh Amendment has not been applied to the states, and the Colorado state constitution does not guarantee the right to a civil jury trial, the statutory damages cap is constitutional.
